Comment: License to Maim: Federal Pre-Emption and the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 by Petrella, Michael E.
Health Matrix: The Journal of Law-
Medicine
Volume 6 | Issue 2
1996
Comment: License to Maim: Federal Pre-Emption
and the Medical Device Amendments of 1976
Michael E. Petrella
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/healthmatrix
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Health Matrix: The Journal of Law-Medicine by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Michael E. Petrella, Comment: License to Maim: Federal Pre-Emption and the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 6 Health Matrix 349
(1996)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/healthmatrix/vol6/iss2/7
COMMENT
LICENSE TO MAIM: FEDERAL
PRE-EMPTION AND THE MEDICAL
DEVICE AMENDMENTS OF 1976
Michael E. Petrella*
I. INTRODUCTION
SUPPOSE YOU LOOKED IN THE MIRROR tomor-
row and noticed a few ugly wrinkles around your eyes. Dis-
mayed, you turn to your family physician for help. "No prob-
lem," the doctor tells you. He recommends a few injections
with a product known as Zyderm, an FDA-approved medical
device more generically referred to as collagen. Elated, you
respond in the affirmative. A few days after treatment, howev-
er, you experience a high fever, sweats, and extreme muscle
pain. "What is going on?" you ask your doctor. As it turns out,
you have developed dermatomyositis/polymyositis (DMIPM),
an autoimmune disease, as a result of the injections. After
several months of discomfort and costly medical attention, you
find that not only have your wrinkles not disappeared, but your
face is permanently scarred.
Infuriated, you now head straight for the family attorney.
"The product must be defective and negligently manufactured,"
your faithful servant of justice informs you. "Let's sue."
Armed with a complaint bearing nineteen counts of products
liability allegations, beaming with anticipation, you and your
attorney dash for the courthouse. Prior to trial, Zyderm's manu-
facturer moves for summary judgment. "Granted!" the judge
* J.D., Case Western Reserve University School of Law (1994).
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scowls. Overcome with disbelief, you ask your attorney why
you can not bring your lawsuit. "Federal pre-emption," shrugs
the lawyer. He sheepishly turns his back on you, your medical
bills, and your hideously deformed countenance. Stalin's Rus-
sia? Castro's Cuba? No. Such is the current state of American
tort law under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Medical Device Amendments of 1976
1. The MDA Classification System
Federal regulation of medical devices was initiated by
Congress in 1976 with the passage of the Medical Device
Amendments (MDA)1 to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA).2 The legislation sought to classify the broad range of
medical devices according to three general categories.3
a. Class I & Class II Medical Devices
Class I medical devices include relatively benign instru-
ments such as tongue depressors.' A device achieves Class I
status if a "reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness
of the device" can be provided pursuant to an enumerated list
of general controls established by the FDCA.6 Even if insuffi-
cient information exists to permit a conclusion that these "gen-
eral controls"7 are capable of affording an acceptable guaran-
tee of safety and effectiveness, a device will be classified as
1. 21 U.S.C. § 360c-1 (1994).
2. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-394 (1994).
3. All classification decisions under the MDA are issued by authority of the Secretary of
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Id. § 360c(b)(1); § 321(d). General
procedures and requirements regarding the MDA classification process are advanced at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 360c(b)-(g).
4. Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1418 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114S. Ct. 86
(1993).
5. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(i) (1994).
6. These "general controls" pertain to adulterated devices, id. § 351, misbranded devices,
id. § 352, device registration, id. § 360, banned devices, id. § 360f, notification requirements and
remedies, id. § 360h, device records and reports, id. § 360i, and other general provisions, id.
§ 360j.
7. See 21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(1) (1992) (referring to certain FDCA provisions collectively
as "general controls").
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Class I where it "is not purported or represented to be for a use
in supporting or sustaining human life or for a use which is of
substantial importance in preventing impairment of human
health,"' and "does not present a potential unreasonable risk of
illness or injury."9 Medical devices falling within the ambit of
this latter category are thus ultimately regulated by the afore-
mentioned FDCA general controls."
Class II medical devices include items such as tampons
and oxygen masks." Such devices cannot be categorized in
Class I because "the general controls themselves are insuffi-
cient to provide reasonable assurance of the safety and effec-
tiveness of the device,"' 2 and, besides, "there is sufficient in-
formation to establish special controls to provide such assur-
ance ....
b. Class III Medical Devices and Premarket Approval (PMA)
Class II medical devices include, among other things, hip
prostheses, intraocular lenses, and heart valves. 4 These devic-
es cannot be placed in either the Class I or the Class II catego-
ry because inadequate information exists to support a determi-
nation that general 5 and special 6 controls would be suffi-
cient to provide a reasonable assurance of safety and effective-
ness." Moreover, Class III devices present "a potential unrea-
sonable risk of illness or injury"'8 or are offered for uses
which support human life, sustain human life, or "prevent the
impairment of human health."' 9 Consequently, Class II medi-
8. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)CA)(ii)(l) (1994).
9. Id. § 360cCa)C1)(A)(ii)(ID.
10. Id.; see also supra note 6.
11. Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1418 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 86
(1993).
12. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B) (1994).
13. Id. "Special controls" include performance standards set by the FDA. Id. General
procedures and requirements for the development of Class II medical device performance
standards are advanced at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360d(a)-(b).
14. Susan A. Allinger, Federal Pre-emption of Products LiabilityActions Against Medical
Device Manufacturers, 29 TEX. TRIAL LAW. F. 1 (1993).
15. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
16. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
17. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C) (1994).
18. Id. §360c(a)(1)(C)(ii)(ll).
19. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii)(I).
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cal devices alone are subject to premarket approval, the most
stringent regulatory procedure established under the MDA.
However, manufacturers of two types of Class Ill devices are
able to avoid the formal premarket approval process. Devices
which are "introduced or delivered for introduction into inter-
state commerce for commercial distribution before May 28,
1976 '"" or "substantially equivalent"' to such a device may
be marketed without premarket approval (PMA), subject to
certain notification requirements.24
All other applicants seeking to market a Class HI device
must submit an application for premarket approval to the Sec-
retary of Health & Human Services (HHS)?5 Applications
must include, among other things, testing data, samples, pro-
posed labelling, and descriptions of manufacturing methods and
materials.26 The FDA then generally refers each application to
a panel of qualified experts.27 The panel reviews the PMA and
prepares a report and recommendation concerning approval.'
Based on the findings of the panel, the Secretary either ap-
proves or disapproves the device for marketing.29 Denial of a
PMA application requires the HHS Secretary to inform the
manufacturer of the measures which must be taken in order to
complete an acceptable application.' Such remedial steps may
include additional research in conjunction with FDA proto-
cols." Ratified Class III devices remain subject to FDA re-
view, and the Secretary may revoke or suspend approval upon
a finding that a given device has proved inadequate in terms of
safety or labelling requirements. 2 The Secretary is authorized
to promulgate recording and reporting regulations in order to
evaluate the continued safety and effectiveness of Class II
20. See generally id. § 360e.
21. Id. § 360e(b)(1)(A).
22. Id. § 360e(b)(1)(B); see also § 360c(i).
23. See id. § 360e(b).
24. See id § 360(k).
25. See id. § 360e(c).
26. Id. § 360e(c)(1).
27. Id. § 360e(c)(2).
28. Id.
29. Id. § 360e(d)(1)(A).
30. Id. § 360e(d)(2).
31. Id.; see also id. § 360e(f).
32. Id. § 360e(e).
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medical devices."
c. Effect on State and Local Requirements
Much of the dispute currently surrounding the Medical
Device Amendments of 1976 stems from a provision which
attempts, albeit with a considerable lack of clarity, to define
the relationship between the federal legislation and other state
and local laws. In this regard, the MDA states:
[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may establish or
continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human
use any requirement (1) which is different from, or in addition
to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to the device,
and (2) which relates to the safety and effectiveness of the
device or to any other matter included in a requirement applica-
ble to the device under this chapter.'
This rather brief Congressional mandate has touched off a sea
of litigation, dividing state and federal courts on its proper in-
terpretation.35 The principal point of controversy in many cas-
es has centered squarely upon the question of whether section
360k of the MDA36 pre-empts state tort and product liability
suits brought by consumers injured by FDA-approved Class III
medical devices which have endured the rigors of the PMA process?
33. See id. § 360i.
34. Id. § 360k(a).
35. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
36. See supra text accompanying note 34.
37. An issue which is beginning to receive increased judicial attention concerns whether
manufacturers of Class I medical devices which pass through the MDA's less stringent,
"substantially equivalent" regulatory route, see supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text, can
enjoy the same blanket pre-emptive effect of § 360k, see supra text accompanying note 34, as that
experienced in the PMA context. Of course, the issue still turns upon whether the plaintiff's
asserted claims would "establish or continue in effect [a state] requirement... different from, or
in addition to," 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994), the federal MDA regulatory scheme "which relates to
the safety or effectiveness of the device... "' Id. Nevertheless, the courts appear to be severely
divided on the proper interpretation of this language in situations involving "substantially equiva-
lent" medical devices. See Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 1994) (pre-empting
plaintiffs state law claims because they related to the safety and effectiveness of a "substantially
equivalent" device and would conflict with specific MDA regulations, but refusing to reach the is-
sue of whether the "substantial equivalence" route constitutes a "requirement" for the purposes of
section 360k(a) of the MDA); Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1423 n.6 (5th Cir.)
(suggesting in dicta that some products liability actions based on injuries incurred from "substan-
tially equivalent" Class HI medical devices might not be pre-empted by § 360k), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 86 (1993); English v. Mentor Corp., No. 93-2725, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7941, (E.D. Pa.
June 10, 1994) (holding that "the MDA's substantial equivalence process is, like the PMA
process, a 'requirement' within the meaning of § 360k(a) that pre-empts state requirements,
19961
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B. Recent Federal Appellate Decisions
1. King v. Collagen Corporation
On September 11, 1992, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit heard King v. Collagen Corpora-
tion.3" The defendant, Collagen Corporation (Collagen), manu-
factured and distributed Zyderm, a Class III medical device
consisting of processed cow tissue.3 9 Zyderm was injected into
the skin in order to alleviate a variety of conditions, including
wrinkles.' In 1987, appellant Jane King received a test injec-
tion of Zyderm prior to full treatment.41 As of the date of the
test dose, Collagen had obtained FDA approval for the device
via the PMA process.42 Shortly after exposure, Mrs. King be-
gan to experience a variety of symptoms, including joint and
muscular pains.' Subsequent tests by Mrs. King's physician
revealed that the patient had acquired DMIPM, an autoimmune
disease wherein the body's immune system identifies and at-
including common law causes of action, relating to the safety or effectiveness of a device");
LaMontagne v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 576, 583 (D. Conn. 1993) (regarding
a patient injured by unclassified "substantially equivalent" jaw implant. State negligence, inad-
equate warning, and warranty claims were not pre-empted under the MDA because no specific
regulations had been issued by FDA for the device); Cameron v. Howmedica, Inc., 820 F. Supp.
317, 321 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (pre-empting state design defect claims due to the existence of a
federal regulation addressing the design of the specific "substantially equivalent" device at issue);
Larsen v. Pacesetter Sys., Inc., 837 P.2d 1273, 1282 (Haw. 1992) (holding that a patient's claims
related to the safety and effectiveness of a "substantially equivalent" Class E11 pacemaker were not
pre-empted by the MDA because FDA finding of "substantial equivalence" did not amount to
approval of device's design).
Those courts which have been reluctant to afford the "substantial equivalence" marketing
route equal standing with the PMA process for the purposes of the pre-emption issue have
generally based their reasoning on the following language in the Federal Regulations
accompanying the MDA: "Although a determination of substantial equivalence involves a review
by the FDA of what is known of the safety and effectiveness of the devices, and may even include
some additional clinical testing, it is not equivalent to an approval by the FDA of the device's
safety and effectiveness." 21 C.F.R. § 807.97 (1992). Stamps, 984 F.2d at 1423 n.6; Larsen, 837
P.2d at 1282. At least two commentators have attempted to evaluate the significance of this
statement as it relates to the pre-emption issue. See Brian J. Donate & Mary Beth Neraas, Federal
Pre-emption of Product Liability Claims Involving Drugs and Medical Devices Regulated Under
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 48 FOOD & DRUG LJ. 305,314-16 (1993).
38. 983 F.2d 1130 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 84 (1993).
39. Id. at 1131.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1132.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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tacks natural skin and muscle tissue." Mrs. King brought suit
alleging strict liability, breach of implied warranty of mer-
chantability, negligence, misbranding and mislabeling, misrep-
resentation, failure to warn, and fraudulent inducement of FDA
approval for Zyderm by Collagen.45 The district court had
granted Collagen's motion for summary judgment, finding that
the MDA pre-empted each of Mrs. King's products liability
claims.'
Filing a separate opinion, Judge Torruella briefly reviewed
the doctrines of express and implied pre-emption and,47 re-
lying on Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,' concluded that
section 360k(a) of the MDA49 constituted express pre-emption
of Mrs. King's causes of action. 0 Judge Torruella felt that it
was "clear that the FDA ha[d] imposed requirements on
Zyderm related to labeling, design, manufacturing and other
aspects of the device pursuant to the MDA scheme."' Conse-
quently, he reasoned, since a state requirement could "emanate
from any requirement established by a state including statues,
regulations, court decision or ordinances,"52 the state products
liability counts advanced by Mrs. King fell within the pre-
emptive sweep of section 360k(a) 3 Judge Torruella then pro-
ceeded to find that each of King's first six causes of action54
would "impose additional or different [state] requirements"55
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. For explanation and commentary regarding the doctrines of federal express and implied
pre-emption, see generally Barbara L. Atwell, Products Liability and Pre-emption: A Judicial
Framework, 39 BUFF. L. REv. 181 (1991); Richard C. Ausness, Federal Pre-emption of State
Products Liability Doctrines, 44 S.C. L. REv. 187 (1993); Philip H. Corboy & Todd A. Smith,
Federal Pre-emption of Product Liability Law: Federalism and the Theory of Implied Pre-
emption, 15 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOc. 435 (1992); Donato & Neraas, supra note 37; Marilyn P.
Westerfield, Comment, Federal Pre-emption and the FDA: What Does Congress Want?, 58 U.
CIN. L. REV. 263 (1989).
48. 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
49. See supra text accompanying note 34.
50. King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1134 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 84
(1993).
51. Id.
52. Id. (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b)) (emphasis added).
53. King, 983 F.2d at 1135-36.
54. See supra text accompanying note 45.
55. King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1135 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 84
(1993).
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on Zyderm so as to conflict with the MDA's federal regulatory
plan. 6 As a result, each count was deemed to be in direct
contravention of section 360k(a). With respect to King's final
allegation that Collagen had fraudulently obtained FDA ap-
proval for Zyderm, Judge Torruella found that appellant's lack
of privity with Collagen was fatal and, alternatively, that the
charge was pre-empted as being essentially equivalent to a
"failure to warn" claim.57
The other two members of the three-judge panel agreed
with the result of Judge Torruella's analysis, but founded their
holding on a different approach. The King majority discerned
two overriding purposes for the MDA as evidenced in the
legislative history accompanying the legislation. First, the court
conceded that the primary emphasis of the statute focused on
"protection of the individual user."5" Nevertheless, the court
insisted, the Senate had implicitly recognized that "[p]erfection
is impossible and a few individuals may be denied full protec-
tion at the cost of benefitting the rest."59 Consistent with this
interpretation, the majority opined, was the second MDA ob-
jective to be culled from the corpus of the available legislative
history - to encourage the research, development, and rapid
dissemination of new and improved medical devices.' Next,
citing what it perceived to be the extensive regulatory require-
ments of the MDA,6 the King majority found that section
360k(a)62 afforded "maximum protection and express pre-
emption, leaving no need to seek implications."'63 And thus it
was held: "[a]s all but one of plaintiff's sustainable claims are
premised on a failure to warn, pre-emption here is unavoidable
.... "' Mrs. King's fraud claim was similarly dismissed.65
56. Id. at 1135-36.
57. Id. at 1136.
58. Id. at 1138.
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 1138-39.
62. See supra text accompanying note 34.
63. King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1139 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 84
(1993).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1139-40.
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2. Stamps v. Collagen Corp.
Just over a month following the King decision, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit entertained its first
opportunity to address the pre-emption issue within the context
of Class III medical devices approved by the FDA through the
PMA procedure. In Stamps v. Collagen Co., Inc.,' Collagen
Corporation again found itself the subject of a lawsuit brought
by a woman who had developed DMIPM.67 However, the al-
legedly defective devices now included not only Zyderm, but
also another Collagen product known as Zyplast.' In addition,
Mrs. Stamps advanced only three state tort law theories: defec-
tive design, inadequate warnings, and negligent failure to
warn.
69
Writing for a unanimous majority, Judge Smith found that
section 360k(a) of the MDA amounted to a Congressional
declaration of express state law pre-emption. 0 Furthermore,
the Stamps court rejected appellant's argument that the provi-
sion was not intended to affect state tort law in particular.
Citing Cipollone,7 the court found that section 360k(a) of the
MDA, like the applicable statute in that case, "sweeps broadly
and suggests no distinction between positive enactments and
common law .... ,72 The court then turned to the question of
whether appellant's specific claims were pre-empted. In this
regard, Stamps relied to a considerable extent upon another
Fifth Circuit opinion, Moore v. Kimberly-Clark Corporation.73
In Moore, the plaintiff sustained injuries as a result of the
use of tampons, a Class II medical device.74 While Moore's
labeling and "failure to warn" state tort claims were held to be
pre-empted by section 360k(a), her defective construction and
design counts, also based on state law, were allowed to
66. 984 F.2d 1416 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 86 (1993).
67. Id. at 1419; see supra text accompanying note 44.
68. Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d at 1419.
69. Id. at 1418.
70. Id. at 1420.
71. 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
72. Stamps, 984 F.2d at 1421 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608,
2620 (1992).
73. 867 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1989).
74. Moore v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 867 F.2d 243, 245 (5th Cir. 1989).
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stand.' The latter causes of action survived because, unlike
warning and labeling features, the MDA did not endeavor to
regulate design and construction aspects of Class II devices."
As a result of Moore, the Stamps court held, appellant's "inad-
equate warning" and "negligent failure to warn" claims were
pre-empted.' Next, extending the Moore rationale and affirm-
ing the trial court's analysis, the Stamps court concluded the
appellant's defective design claim also was pre-empted under
section 360k(a) because the more pervasive scope of MDA
regulation in the Class III context (relative to the Class II con-
text) encompassed oversight of this area," and hence rendered
the theory a "requirement either different from, or in addition
to, a [federal] requirement - the Class III PMA process -
that the MDA has made applicable to Zyderm and Zyplast."79
III. SHOULD INJURED CLASS III MEDICAL DEVICE
CONSUMERS BE DENIED ACCESS TO STATE
PRODUCTS LIABILITY REMEDIES?
As the preceding sections suggest, most of the current
legal battles being fought over medical device tort suits center
around the pre-emption issue.' Indeed, many persuasive argu-
75. Id. at 247.
76. Id. at 246.
77. Id. at 247.
78. Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1422 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 86
(1993).
79. Id. at 1421.
80. See Moore v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 867 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating where
plaintiff sustained injuries from the use of tampons, a Class II medical device, state law claims
based on inadequate labeling and warning pre-empted by MDA, but claims alleging defective
design, composition, and construction not pre-empted); Ministry of Health v. Shiley, Inc., 858
F.Supp. 1426 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (following King with regard to negligence, misbranding, failure to
warn, and strict liability claims, but refusing to follow King as to breach of warranty, fraud, and
misrepresentation claims); Parenteau v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopedics, Inc., 856 F.Supp. 61
(D.N.H. 1994) (stating strict liability, negligence, implied warranty, and loss of consortium claims
based on injury caused by Class II knee prosthesis survive pre-emption due to absence of specific
FDA regulations pertaining to the device); Brown v. Medtronic, Inc., 852 F.Supp. 717 (S.D. Ind.
1994) (pre-empting all claims arising from use of dorsal column stimulator except for those
involving Class II lead wire portion); Mulligan v. Pfizer, Inc., 850 F.Supp. 633 (S.D. Ohio 1994)
(denying that section 360k(a) of the MDA was intended to pre-empt state tort claims arising from
the use of medical devices); Tucker v. Collagen Corp., No.93 C2375, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3101 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 1994) (following Stamps and King); Michael v. Shiley, Inc., No. 93-1729,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1973 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 1994) (pre-empting plaintiff's state negligence,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, strict liability, warranty, and fraud claims regarding
358 [Vol. 6:349
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ments can be formulated which might seemingly justify a re-
versal of the Stamps and King adjudications."1 However, the
Bjork-Shiley heart valve prothesis, a PMA-sanctioned Class III medical device); Bravman v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 842 F.Supp. 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (state products liability counts brought
against manufacturer of Class III heart valve which had received premarket approval pre-empted
under MDA); Griffin v. Medtronic, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 396 (D. Md. 1994) (state tort claims based
on allegedly defective pacemaker pre-empted, including count sounding in fraud); Elbert v.
Howmedica, Inc., 841 F.Supp. 327 (D. Haw. 1993) (where Class I knee prothesis caused injury,
plaintiff's state negligence, warranty, and strict liability claims not pre-empted because device was
not subject to rigorous PMA process and only existing MDA regulations applicable to prosthesis
related merely to identification); Gondeau v. Mentor Corp., No. 1:92CV2149, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20157 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 14, 1993) (strict products liability claim based on Class III
prosthesis pre-empted by MDA); Murray v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 93-1196, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17476 (E.D. La. Dec. 2, 1993) (state products liability counts pre-empted under MDA as to Class
III medical device components of dorsal column stimulator, but not pre-empted as to Class II
constituents); Kemp v. Pfizer, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (MDA pre-empts eleven
state tort claims advanced by widow of patient who died after treatment with a prosthetic heart
valve, a premarket-approved Class I1 device); Schubert v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 92-2967, 1993
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13700 (E.D. La. Sept. 29, 1993) (pre-empting all claims arising from use of
Class III dorsal column stimulator except for those involving Class II lead wire portion); Sloman
v. Tambrands, Inc., 841 F.Sup. 699 (D.Md. 1993) (MDA pre-empts negligence, failure to warn
and punitive damages claims arising from the use of tampons, a Class II device); Reiter v.
Zimmer, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (FDA's premarket approval of bone cement, a
Class IlI medical device, pre-empts plaintiff's strict liability claim, but not a claim that defendant
had not complied with its own FDA-approved manufacturing process); Northrip v. International
Playtex, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 402 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (where plaintiff sustained injuries from the use
of tampons, a Class U medical device, state law claims based on inadequate labeling and warning
pre-empted by MDA, but claims alleging defective design, composition, and construction not pre-
empted); Bejarano v. International Playtex, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 443 (D. Idaho 1989) (same);
Lindquist v. Tambrands, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 1058 (D. Minn. 1989) (MDA pre-empts state
"inadequate warning" claim brought by plaintiff who had developed toxic shock syndrome from
use of tampons); Desmarais v. Dow Coming Corp., 712 F. Supp. 13 (D. Conn. 1989) ("failure to
warn" claim advanced by patient injured due to leaking silicone breast implants not expressly pre-
empted, but only because plaintiff received implants before effective date of MDA); Cornelison v.
Tambrands, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 706 (D. Minn. 1989) (MDA pre-empts state "inadequate warning"
claim brought by plaintiff who had developed toxic shock syndrome from use of tampons); Callan
v. G.D. Searle & Co., 709 F. Supp. 662 (D. Md. 1989) (holding that products liability claims were
not pre-empted because MDA did not apply to IUDs, which were regulated by FDA as
prescription drugs in 1989, and that even if MDA did apply, the statute did not intend to pre-empt
state tort law); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293 (D. Minn. 1988) (same). See
generally Beverly L. Jacklin, Annotation, Federal Pre-Emption of State Common-Law Products
Liability Claims Pertaining to Drugs, Medical Devices, and Other Health-Related Items, 98
A.L.R. FED. 124(1992).
81. See generally Brief for Appellant, Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416 (5th Cir.)
(No. 92-2084), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 86 (1993) [hereinafter Stamps Brief]. Many of the courts
which have followed the Stamps and King readings of the pre-emption issue appear to have
overlooked some critical language in the federal regulations accompanying section 360k(a) of the
MDA. The regulations state: "[Section 360k(a)] does not pre-empt State or local requirements of
general applicability where the purpose of the requirement relates either to other products in
addition to devices (e.g ..... general electric codes and the Uniform Commercial Code.... ), or to
unfair trade practices in which the requirements are not limited to devices." 21 C.F.R.
§ 808.1(d)(1) (1992).
Moreover, the actual text of the MDA appears explicitly to recognize the continued
19961
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author eschews a jaunt into this well-trodden territory in favor
of a different approach.
The legislative history which accompanies the Medical
Device Amendments of 1976 reveals a Congressional intent to
further two principal goals: 1) the protection of the medical
device consumer"2 and 2) the encouragement of the rapid de-
velopment and availability of new and beneficial medical de-
vices. s3 Based on these asserted ends, this Note now seeks to
assess the wisdom of perpetuating the effect of an MDA which
denies access to state tort law for plaintiffs who have incurred
injuries from the use of Class HII medical devices84 approved
by the FDA via the PMA process. We will also explore the
question of whether this approach in practice serves to strike
the proper, congressionally intended balance between the two
goals. Should the lack of state tort remedies prove incongruous
to the attainment and reconciliation of the identifiable MDA
legislative objectives," a more direct tack is required which
will circumvent the judicial pre-emption quagmire and restore
the full panoply of products liability remedies to aggrieved
medical consumers.86
validity of state tort causes of action based on injuries sustained by consumers as the result of the
use of medical devices. See Mulligan v. Pfizer, Inc., 850 F.Supp. 633 (S.D. Ohio 1994)
(advancing a persuasive argument against MDA pre-emption of state products liability claims
based on § 360h of the act); see also 21 U.S.C. § 360h (1994) (especially section 360h(d) which
states: "Compliance with an order issued under this section shall not relieve any person from
liability under Federal or State law").
82. See King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1138 (1st Cir.) ("Concededly, the
[legislative history of the] Medical Device Amendments of 1976, shows the principal emphasis to
be on the protection of the individual user"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 84 (1993); S. REP. No. 33,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070, 1071 ("Medical device
legislation is intended to assure that medical devices ... meet the requirements of safety and
effectiveness before they are put in wide-spread use throughout the United States") [hereinafter
MDA Legislative History].
83. See MDA Legislative History, supra note 82, at 1071 ("[A]n increasing number of
sophisticated, critically important medical devices are being developed and used in the United
States. These devices hold the promise of improving the health and longevity of the American
people. The Committee wants to encourage their research and development").
84. Our discussions here deal exclusively with the pre-emption issue in the context of Class
IRl medical devices. For the sake of clarity and brevity, Class H devices will not be considered.
However, the reader should bear in mind that many of the arguments advanced here may be
equally applicable to the pre-emption of state products liability actions based on injuries sustained
from the use of Class II devices.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
86. The structure of our analysis can be analogized to one commentator's perception of
how courts should resolve the pre-emption issue: "Mhe proper approach is to determine whether
the continued existence of the state law is consistent with the general purpose of the federal statute
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A. An Evaluation: Is Pre-emption Consistent with the
Attainment of MDA Legislative Goals?
1. Consumer Protection
a. The Safety Incentives Created by Products Liability Law
Congress presumably envisioned that the MDA would
advance the goal of consumer protection in the Class III medi-
cal device context through the comprehensive and rigorous
regulatory system established by the PMA process.8 7 Howev-
er, one encounters difficulty in attempting to refute the obser-
vation that state tort law tends to serve a similar purpose. In-
deed, many courts and commentators have recognized that the
threat of products liability invariably encourages manufacturer
self-monitoring and serves a deterrent function, hence creating
an incentive for manufacturers to market safer products.88
Thus, absent the looming spectre of legally compelled
by seeking to define the evil Congress sought to remedy and the method chosen to effectuate its
cure." Lester J. Mazor, Note, Pre-Emption As A Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construc-
tion, 12 STAN. L. REv. 208,210 (1959).
87. Se 21 U.S.C. § 360e (1994); supra note 82.
88. See Bravman v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., No. 89 Civ. 3444 (RWS), 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 546, (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1994) ('TIhe state tort law system currently acts as an incentive
for manufacturers to continue to improve their products as well as to disclose developments in
products safety and their side effects .... It must be recognized that state tort actions ... remain a
powerful incentive for improving product safety"); MacGilivray v. Lederle Lab., 667 F. Supp.
743,745 (D.N.M. 1987) (recognizing that tort actions could induce drug manufacturers to develop
and market safer products); Graham v. Wyeth Lab., 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1493 (D. Kan. 1987)
(noting that state tort suits against vaccine manufacturers are consistent with the goal of maximum
national health); Atwell, supra note 47, at 207, 226 ("Permitting tort claims ... clearly furthers
the goal of keeping the public informed by giving manufacturers an incentive to be as direct and
forthright in their warnings as possible .... Products liability laws ... also ... protect public
safety. They provide manufacturers with incentives to make their products as safe as possible");
Ausness, supra note 47, at 251 ("[M]anufacturers would have little incentive to spend money on
product safety if the costs of product-related injuries were bourne entirely by accident victims. A
strict liability rule forces manufacturers to choose between paying damages ... or spending
money to prevent them from occurring in the first place'); Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis
of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 79, 137 (1982) ("iThere is now a rich body of academic
literature supporting the view that a primary purpose of tort liability rules is to discourage
inappropriate behavior on the part of accident causers"); Corboy & Smith, supra note 47, at 455
("Tort law is unquestionably intended to foster socially desirable conduct"); Clarence Morris,
Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1173, 1177 (1931) (recognizing that both
compensatory and punitive damages awards serve an "admonitory" function); John W. Wade, On
the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MIss. LJ. 825, 826 (1973) (products liability
can prevent excessively dangerous products from reaching the market); Westerfield, supra note
47, at 282 ("A tort judgment against a manufacturer could work to provide an incentive to develop
improved, safer [products]").
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remuneration for injured consumers of defective Class fII med-
ical devices, manufacturer incentives shift drastically toward
the blind and uninhibited pursuit of economic gain. With the
"nuisance" of state products liability actions permanently abat-
ed, what motive can a Class III medical device producer harbor
other than to secure FDA approval for a device as quickly and
as inexpensively as possible? But let us temper this argument.
While many manufacturers undoubtedly regard product safety
as a paramount consideration, the potential nevertheless exists
for unscrupulous companies to exploit the "free rein"89 afford-
ed by decisions like Stamps and King in order to achieve maxi-
mum revenues before the inevitable consumer complaints begin
to mount."° The temptation intensifies as these corporations
realize that negative public reaction can be largely deflected
with the badge of legitimacy provided by pre-marketing FDA
approval.9 Allowing such a system of perverse incentives to
continue unchecked is akin to playing "Russian Roulette" with
the health of patients who have placed full trust in the compe-
tency of their physician and the FDA.
Moreover, the circumstances become more ominous when
we note that the accuracy of the FDA's PMA process is large-
ly, if not exclusively, dependent upon testing and safety data
provided solely by the manufacturer-applicant. 9 Limited FDA
89. Many courts and commentators have likened the federal pre-emption of state products
liability law to the effective immunization of manufacturers from responsibility for the safety of
their products. See, e.g., Wack v. Lederle Lab., 666 F. Supp. 123, 128 (N.D. Ohio 1987)
(supporting denial of state tort claims will serve to grant defendants immunity from liability for
allegedly negligent conduct).
90. See supra notes 38-79 and accompanying text.
91. See 21 U.S.C.§360e (1994).
92. See Hurley v. Lederle Lab., 851 F.2d 1536, 1542 (5th Cir.) (characterizing the FDA as
a "passive" agency which must rely substantially upon product information provided by
manufacturer-applicants), superseded by 863 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1988). A 1992 House Report
clearly expressed the nature of FDA reliance upon device manufacturers:
It is unfortunate that FDA advisory committee meetings ... continue to rely almost
exclusively on information provided by the company whose product is under review,
or their paid consultants. Other researchers are rarely invited to participate .... As a
result, important research results and clinical findings that are not supportive of the
application may be excluded from review by FDA staff or the advisory committee.
This is a serious flaw in the current approval system, which makes it especially
difficult for the FDA to make unbiased decisions.
HOUSE COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS, Is THE FDA PROTECrING CONSUMERS FROM
DANGEROUS OFF-LABEL USES OF MEDICAL DRUGS AND DEVICEs?, H. REP. No. 1064, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1992) (additional views of Hon. Donald Payne) [hereinafter OPERATIONS
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financial resources and staffing translate into a PMA regulatory
system in which economically motivated profiteers are empow-
ered to skew the approval decision in their favor before the
process even begins.93 In short, the FDA has essentially en-
trusted the fox with responsibility for guarding the proverbial
henhouse. Is it beyond the realm of possibility that some appli-
cants might exploit this situation by "simplifying" testing,
recording, and reporting procedures?94 Worse still, might not
the FDA eventually become a pawn of medical device manu-
facturer interests?95 Thus, given the glaring disparity between
the relative capacities of manufacturers and consumers to pro-
tect their respective interests throughout the PMA process, it is
easy to conclude that the "safety net" of state products liability
law is necessary to counteract the disproportionate influence
exerted by Class III medical device producers.
b. The Complaisance of the FDA
A critic might dismiss the arguments advanced in the
preceding section as unfounded and alarmist. He would likely
maintain that the PMA system after Stamps and King provides
adequate protection to the general public,' and insist that the
process necessarily sacrifices the protection of the "idiosyncrat-
ic few"97 in order to ensure a regulatory scheme which serves
REPORT]. Moreover, the information provided by device labels "is limited by data that the
manufacturer provides to the FDA, and by pressure from the manufacturer to make the warnings
less frightening to doctors and their patients." Id. at 31; see also Stamps Brief, supra note 81, at 4-
5 ("The FDA does not do independent research on the information provided by the manufacturer,
the agency merely reviews the papers which the device's proponent submits").
93. See, e.g., Ausness, supra note 47, at 276 ("Mhe FDA has experienced budget cutbacks
and staff reductions over the past decade. This lack of resources limits the FDA's ability to obtain
information about ... risks from independent sources and forces the agency to rely heavily on
information provided by ... manufacturers"); Bruce A. Silverglade, Pre-emption: The Consumer
Viewpoint, 45 FOOD DRUG COSM. LJ. 143, 144 (1990) (noting that FDA budget restraints have
led to the loss of approximately 2000 FDA employees since 1980).
94. See infra notes 107.14, 124 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 114-24 and accompanying text.
96. Cf Pennington P. Landen, Federal Pre-emption and the Drug Industry: Can Courts
Co-Regulate?, 43 FOOD DRUG COSM. L. 85, 112 (1988) (arguing that the FDA is a potent
federal agency); Charles J. Walsh & Marc S. Klein, The Conflicting Objectives of Federal and
State Tort Law Drug Regulation, 41 FOOD DRUG COSM. LJ. 171, 193 (1986) (defending FDA
standards both comprehensive and rigorous).
97. King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1138 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 84
(1993).
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the greater good. He would steadfastly argue that the FDA is
an expert, disinterested entity capable of deterring undesirable
marketing practices through the imposition of fines and penal-
ties upon transgressors.98 Our critic would be wrong. In fact,
the FDA has drawn considerable fire in recent years for acting
as a reliable "rubber stamp" for medical device manufacturers
rather than as an objective and zealous protectorate of public
safety.99
In 1992, Thomas Dorney, Special Assistant to the Over-
sight Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Com-
mittee, raised "allegations that medical device reviewers at the
FDA are unofficially required to maintain a ninety-eight per-
cent approval rate of medical devices, irrespective of whether
the devices actually deserve approval.""' Dorney's charges
were based on an extensive study which included interviews
with FDA staffers, the examination of a wide range of medical
device applications, and the survey of confidential question-
naires completed by Office of Device Evaluation (ODE) re-
viewers."1 The investigation concluded that device evaluators
who exceeded the expected two percent disapproval limit were
subjected to a myriad of sanctions in order to bring them back
into compliance." FDA staff members also were charged
with pandering to the medical device industry and seeking to
facilitate the approval of unworthy PMA applications over the
objections of "recalcitrant" medical device reviewers."3 One
anonymous FDA official reportedly acknowledged that "many
98. See Landen, supra note 96, at 119 (asserting that the FDA is a neutral entity, unlikely to
be susceptible to various "special interest" pressures).
99. See Dingell Continues FDA Device Probe, Predicasts, June 10, 1992, available in
LEXIS, News Library ("FDA officials are pressuring rank and file inspectors to rubber-stamp
approval of medical devices, say investigators .... [S]urveys and interviews ... reveal a 'review
process geared solely toward approval' in which managers use 'coercive tactics' to keep up with a
heavy workload").
100. Robin E. Margolis, Is FDA's Medical Device Evaluation Process Overly Complaisant
to Industry?, HEALTHSPAN, July/Aug. 1992, at 19, available in WESTLAW, File No. 270
(Prentice Hall Law and Business).
101. Id.
102. Id. Sanctions were alleged to include: "[G]iving disapproved applications to other
reviewers; labeling uncooperative reviewers as 'nitpicker[s]' and 'not a 'team player'; holding
back those reviewers' promotions and bonuses; withdrawing those reviewers' training
opportunities, permissions to publish, and credit for their scientific contributions; and
continuously hounding, challenging, or browbeating those reviewers"). Id.
103. Id.
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companies will try and get away with providing the least
amount of information possible ... ,""0 and hence confirmed
concerns raised in the previous section which hypothesized that
medical device manufacturers left unbounded by the strictures
of state tort law might conceivably cut FDA-established cor-
ners."' More alarmingly, "[m]edical device reviewers also
allegedly told the investigators that medical device documenta-
tion is sometimes taken from files or destroyed, never placed
in files, or altered."'"
Similar and more serious allegations received a substantial
additional dose of validity through a 1992 House Report ap-
proved and adopted by the Committee on Government Opera-
tions. The Report verified that Class III medical device produc-
ers do in fact seek to deceive the FDA regarding the negative
health effects associated with the use of their products. 0 7 Cit-
ing a Texas Department of Health investigation, the Report
stated that:
Texas officials concluded that Collagen Corp. had provided
inaccurate data on the safety of their product. They claim the
company failed to report hundreds of adverse reactions to the
FDA's MDR (Medical Device Reporting) system. For example,
Dr. Richard Beauchamp, an epidemiologist at the Texas Depart-
ment of Health, testified that Collagen Corp. reported only fifty-
four adverse reactions from the more than 6,000 consumer
complaints received. The Texas Department of Health conclud-
ed that more than 800 systemic reactions, as well as other seri-
ous problems, were not reported to the FDA's MDR sys-
tem."0
Subsequent to the Texas study, the Report continued, the FDA
reviewed 508 patient files and ultimately determined that, of
the one-third of the cases which were deemed serious enough
to require FDA notification, Collagen Corporation had failed to
submit a single report."° An additional thirty-nine percent of
the files were found to be so fundamentally flawed that it be-
came "impossible to determine whether or not reports should
104. Id.
105. See supra text accompanying note 94.
106. Margolis, supra note 100.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 92-95.
108. OPERATIONS REPORT, supra note 92, at 25.
109. Id.
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have been filed." ' ° In response, FDA provided Collagen with
six examples of the type of cases which should have been
reported. These anomalies included lupus, abscesses, arthritis,
and scarring."' Nevertheless, the company defended its non-
disclosure decisions on the grounds that such maladies were
either not sufficiently serious to warrant mention, or not attrib-
utable to the use of collagen.Y2 In a refreshing display of
candor, the 1992 House Report characterized the scenario as a
"classic Catch-22 situation: the company has informed phy-
sicians that collagen does not cause autoimmune disorders, and
it is therefore not surprising that the physicians do not report
that a case of lupus was caused by the injections."".. The Re-
port further capitulated that the phenomenon of inadequate
reporting procedures among device manufacturers was wide-
spread, and by no means unique to the FDA's experience with
Collagen Corporation." 4
Moreover, the Report found that the FDA had served as
more than a mere passive party to Collagen's MDA reporting
violations. In fact, the administrative agency was criticized for
negotiating "a new definition of adverse reactions with Colla-
gen officials.""' 5 As a result of this concession, the company
had agreed to report autoimmune disorders only where the
doctor failed to state specifically that collagen probably did not
give rise to the adverse reaction observed." 6 In addition, re-
porting requirements were waived for incidences of scarring
which lasted less than six months or did not yet constitute
"permanent damage."".7 With respect to the FDA "compro-
mise," the House Report declared that:
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. Other salient findings contained in the Report indicated that the injuries sustained
by the plaintiffs in the Stamps and King cases might have been avoided had Collagen Corp. fully
complied with MDA reporting requirements. See id. at 26 ('Texas Department of Health officials
criticized Collagen Corp. for misleading the FDA and the public about the safety of their product,
whether for approved or off-label uses. They focused on growing evidence that collagen injections
might cause or trigger autoimmune diseases, particularly... [PMIDM]").
114. Id. at 30 ("Collagen is but one of many cases where the subcommittee has found tre-
mendous shortcomings in the adverse reaction reporting system").
115. Id.at26.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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By acquiescing to company pressure to eliminate many negative
side effects from the MDR reporting requirements, the FDA has
undermined the ability of patients and potential patients to learn
about the problems experienced by other consumers. It also
makes it more difficult for the FDA to determine the potential
risks. Since informed consent depends on accurate information
about risks as well as benefits, the FDA has undermined that
process by allowing the company to ignore valuable information
about adverse reactions."5r
Nor did the FDA take any steps to enforce available criminal
sanctions against Collagen after it had become apparent that
the corporation was violating MDA reporting regulations. The
Committee chastised the agency, recognizing that
[E]ven when... information was provided, the FDA was reluc-
tant to pursue criminal prosecution of the company for their
failure to obey the law. If the FDA is not willing to enforce the
law, it will not be surprising if companies do not take those
reporting requirements seriously. Enforcement would have an
important deterrent effect that would also benefit consum-
ers.119
Finally, FDA performance was found to be deficient in a
number of other critical areas. General testing and review
procedures," labelling regulation,' and the policing of
off-label uses" all were identified as spheres of FDA in-
118. Id.
119. Jd.at30-31.
120. The Report noted that, despite clear evidence regarding the health risks involved in the
cosmetic use of silicone, FDA sanctioned a "thoroughly unscientific" human study of the product
in the mid-1960s. Id. at 18. The subcommittee concluded: "The FDA should have responded to
these major shortcomings by refusing to approve Dow Coming's proposed study in 1965;
however, the FDA approved the study proposal, and the study was conducted for the next 10
years." Id. In addition, "just as the FDA did not carefully monitor the use of silicone injections by
'investigators' participating in the Dow Corning studies, the FDA also failed to respond to the
increasingly widespread use of silicone injections by other physicians." Id. at 19. More specifi-
cally, "the FDA did virtually nothing ... to protect consumers or to criticize clinicians or
manufacturers. Despite their inaction, FDA officials were concerned about the dangers of silicone
injections and knew that the agency was responsible for regulating the product." Id.
121. See id. at 31 (noting that on many occasions, the FDA had "succumbed to pressure
from the manufacturer to back down on decisions it had made regarding the labeling for collagen
injections. Although manufacturers deserve the opportunity to defend their product, it is equally
important that patients' right to informed consent be considered").
122. Off-label uses are defined as "those [uses] that the FDA has not determined to be safe
or effective, either because the manufacturer did not submit an application requesting approval for
such uses, or because the FDA did not approve an application that was submitted in support for
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fluence which had been egregiously neglected. Truly, the over-
all tenor of the House Report was sufficiently dismal to lead
one committee member to note bluntly that: "This report pres-
ents very troubling findings about FDA's failure to protect
consumers from products whose risks may far outweigh their
benefits."'" The agency's medical device review process gar-
nered additional criticism in 1993 and 1994.124
such uses." Id. at 2. Off-label uses are illegal. See 21 U.S.C. § 352 (1994). Dr. Lawrence Solomon,
head of the dermatology department at the University of Illinois Medical School, has noted that
"sanctions against the illegal promotion of [drugs and devices] for an off-label use are viewed
simply as one of the costs of doing business for some companies, because the benefits of this
practice far outweigh the penalties, and the penalties are rarely enforced by the FDA."
OPERATIONS REPORT, supra note 92, at 29.
123. OPERATIONS REPORT, supra note 92, at 41 (additional views of Hon. Donald M.
Payne).
124. In 1993, a 246-page House Report declared that "A series of subcommittee hearings
and investigations have documented a number of instances in which the FDA approved devices
that proved unsafe in use. In every case that the subcommittee examined, personnel within the
FDA were aware of problems with the device at the time of approval." HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON
OvERsIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 103D CONG., 1ST SESS., LESS THAN THE SUM OF rrs PARTS 1
(Comm. Print 1993). Since the FDA had failed to implement various MDA provisions punctually,
the Report noted, "the assurances of safety intended by the 1976 Amendments have not been
realized." Id. at 8. The Report further cited a 1991 hearing which focused on "the FDA's apparent
inability to evaluate the merits of an application for approval to market a medical device under a
... PMA." Id. at 15. In addition, "[t]wo subcommittee hearings in 1992 noted that the FDA
continues to regulate devices inadequately due to serious problems in its device monitoring and
approval structures, which hinder FDA's efforts to preclude or minimize the occurrence of device
failures or chronic problems." Id. at 17. The 1993 Report also pointed to an earlier investigation
which concluded that "the FDA was regulating pacemakers as if they were no riskier than tongue
depressors and that the Agency's failure to implement reporting requirements had resulted in a
lack of knowledge about the risks associated with certain devices." Id. at 10. Referring to a
previous case study involving heart valves manufactured by Shiley, Inc., the Subcommittee noted
that "Shiley kept the FDA uninformed of the problems by failing to report incidences of strut
fracture and by withholding information regarding manufacturing and design issues." I: at 12.
Thus, it had become "apparent that the environment of voluntary compliance in which the FDA
and medical device manufacturers operated was ineffective... and that the FDA was incapable of
wielding regulatory authority against uncooperative medical device manufacturers." lId As a
result, "[t]he FDA failed to respond to the high numbers of deaths and injuries associated with the
catastrophic failure of the ... heart valves .... " Id. A series of case studies detailed in the 1993
Report "revealed that the FDA could not, or would not implement the procedures needed to meet
the objectives of the [MDA]." Id. at 21.
In a more general indictment of the FDA's device review system, it was acknowledged
that "[t]he PMA process for critical (Class I) devices has rested on the integrity of data
submitted by the medical device manufacturer seeking approval." Id. at 57. Although the FDA
was found to have established a method for evaluating the accuracy of such information, inspector
efforts were found to be "usually confined to procedural audits, which check to see only if the
research protocols are being followed, and generally do not seek to determine whether the data
generated by the clinical trials will demonstrate that the device is safe and effective." lId With
respect to enforcement, the subcommittee recognized that, despite recent efforts, serious
institutional deficiencies still existed within the FDA, including an "historically weak and
ineffective management information system, which includes an adverse reaction device reporting
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Thus, it should now be apparent that FDA oversight alone
is wholly insufficient to protect the health and safety of Class
III medical device consumers. While the PMA system was
undoubtedly originally intended as a comprehensive federal
means to ensure patient well-being," this vision has just as
surely been relegated to little more than an empty promise. It
is important to recall at this point that Class III medical devic-
es are classified as such because they are deemed to be either
highly intrusive and implicative of human health or capable of
presenting "a potential unreasonable risk of illness or inju-
ry."' Nevertheless, we have already seen that FDA scrutiny
of these items does not even begin to approximate the neces-
sary rigidity which the above definition clearly requires. The
inherent reliance upon information supplied by manufacturers
throughout the PMA process,127 the demonstrated willingness
of device producers to mislead the FDA, the susceptibility
of the FDA to industry pressures,'29 and the reluctance of the
agency to enforce MDA regulations13° all combine to create a
predicament in which uninformed patients are virtually helpless
in attempting to guard against imprudent and untested medical
treatments. As the federal circuits inexorably follow the lead of
recent court decisions which pre-empt state products liability
system that the FDA itself acknowledged to be useless .... "Id. at 66. Such difficulties were
viewed as being "compounded by the lack of adequate inspector training." Id. at 69. Not
surprisingly, the Subcommittee's report bluntly concluded that "the FDA has been unable to carry
out its statutory requirements adequately." Id. at 19. The list of FDA shortcomings continues
throughout the comprehensive report, and is far too lengthy to be addressed fully here.
Moreover, on February 2, 1994, Bruce A. Finzen informed the House Subcommittee on
Commerce, Consumer Protection and Competitiveness that "FDA approval of a medical device or
pharmaceutical product is no guarantee of safety and effectiveness of that product, much less any
guarantee that the manufacturers of the product have been free from punitive conduct in the
design, testing or manufacture of the product." Prepared Testimony of Bruce A. Finzen, Esquire,
Partner, Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, Minneapolis, Minnesota; HR. 1910- Fairness In
Product Liability Act of 1993; The U.S. House of Representatives, Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer Protection and Competitiveness, Federal News
Service, Feb. 2, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File. In addition, Finzen stated
that "industry's perception of the FDA's inability to effectively perform its duties of conducting
both pre-and post-market surveillance of the safety and efficacy of products dramatically lowers
the quality of those products." Id.
125. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
126. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii)(U)(1994).
127. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 100-24 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 115-19, 124 and accompanying text.
130. See supra text accompanying note 119.
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law under MDA auspices, citizens like Jennifer Stamps and
Jane King will be shorn of their last line of defense against the
hegemony consistently exhibited by Class III medical device
manufacturers.13' As a result, individuals injured by any giv-
en "PMA-approved" device are more likely to prove the com-
monplace victims of shoddy design, premature marketing, or
woefully inadequate testing rather than the unfortunate mem-
bers of the discrete class so tactfully monikered by the King
court as the "idiosyncratic few."'132
In light of the foregoing then, the tendency of state tort
law to encourage product safety must be viewed as wholly
consistent with the Congressionally enunciated objective of
safeguarding consumer health through the MDA1 33 More im-
portantly, the arguments advanced above indicate that, given
the current state of FDA review procedures, the failure to
permit state products liability actions based on injuries sus-
tained through the use of Class III medical devices actually is
antithetical to the attainment of that goal.
131. Indeed, the pre-emption of state products liability law leaves injured Class III medical
device consumers with virtually no legal recourse against a manufacturer. See, e.g., Stamps v.
Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1425 (5th Cir.) ("[Wie acknowledge that our reading of the MDA
effectively denies Stamps access to state law damages actions as a remedy for her injuries."), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 86 (1993); Reiter v. Zimmer, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 199, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(characterizing state products liability law pre-emption under the MDA as a "harsh outcome").
The plaintiff's predicament remains the same even where the producer has allegedly deceived or
misled the FDA during the PMA process. See King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1140 (1st.
Cir.) (responding to plaintiff's allegation that defendant had fraudulently obtained FDA approval
of collagen, the court found pre-emption under the MDA not only ran "afoul of the general
principle against implying personal causes of action... plaintiff would be breaching the federal
dike in the absence of its keeper"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 84 (1993); Michael v. Shiley, Inc., No.
93-1729, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1973, *29-*30 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 1994) ("Ms. Michael also
alleges fraud was committed on the FDA, and therefore seeks in effect to act as a private attorney
general on the agency's behalf. We find no warrant for allowing Ms. Michael to serve as the
FDA's champion"); Hamilton v. Surgidev Corp., No. 92-3466, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17858,
(E.D. La. Dec. 9, 1993) (pre-empting under the MDA plaintiff's claim that defendant had
fraudulently misrepresented and concealed the defective nature of the medical device at issue);
Kemp v. Pfizer, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 1015, 1018 (E.D. Mich. 1993) ("Plaintiff has alleged that
defendants engaged in a campaign of disinformation against the public and the FDA. Even if true,
plaintiff's state law claims are still pre-empted. This court will not imply a personal cause of
action based on violations of the MDA .... ).
132. King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d at 1138.
133. See Atwell, supra note 47, at 226 ("Since the objectives of both products liability laws
and Congress are to enhance public awareness and safety, the goals are compatible. Thus,
permitting common law tort claims to be considered on the merits furthers Congressional
objectives. It does not stand as an obstacle to accomplishing them"); supra note 82.
LICENSE TO MAIM
2. Encouragement of Medical Device Development &
Marketing
a. Reconsidering the ends
As noted previously, the second major Congressional goal
apparent from the legislative history of the MDA involves
encouraging the expeditious development and availability of
new and improved Class III medical devices. 134 Recent
courts, most notably the King tribunal, 3' have cited this ob-
jective in order to bolster their findings of state products liabil-
ity law pre-emption under the MDA1 36 The reasoning is quite
simple: medical device manufacturers will be much more in-
clined to research, develop, and market new products absent
the threat of numerous and costly suits for monetary damages
initiated by injured consumers. 37 In the Class In device con-
text, the task of patient protection, under this theory, is of
course, left to the comprehensive and infallible FDA oversight
authorized and established by the MDA's PMA process.
131
However, the mere Congressional assertion of an intent to
facilitate the invention of new devices and consumer access
thereto does not alone tell the entire story. We must carry the
ideas conveyed by this base policy assertion to their logical
conclusion. Indeed, closer analysis indicates that the simple
existence of new Class III devices and a coincident potential
availability to patients cannot have been the ultimate outcome
desired when Congress enacted the MDA. Consider the follow-
ing statement contained within the legislative history of the
MDA: "The purpose of this authority is to permit new or im-
proved devices to be marketed without delay so that the public
may have such beneficial devices available to them as soon as
possible."'39 Implicit in the legislature's announced aim lies a
more critical purpose, a purpose perhaps too obvious to war-
134. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 38-65 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., Kemp v. Pfizer, Inc., 835 F.Supp. 1015, 1018 (E.D. Mich. 1993) ("The MDA
allows and encourages manufacturers to produce new medical devices without the threat of tort
litigation").
137. See supra notes 59-60,84 and accompanying text.
138. See21 U.S.C.§360e(1994).
139. MDA Legislative History, supra note 82, at 1083 (emphasis added).
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rant specific mention. Nevertheless, since the First Circuit was
unwilling to elucidate, the author will gladly oblige. The perti-
nent point is this: surely Congress would have viewed the rapid
development and accessibility of Class III medical devices as
worthless sans the willingness of patients actually to submit to
treatment with such instrumentalities. Truly, a device can only
be termed "beneficial" if the persons whom it is intended to
benefit are amenable to its use; a mechanism which sits on the
shelf gathering dust may have the potential to do immense
good, but it has yet to produce any tangible societal advantage.
Thus, the relevant Congressional goal must not be viewed as
the prompt development and availability of new Class III de-
vices, but rather the speedy utilization of such products. Evalu-
ated from this perspective, as we shall see, the role of state
products liability law becomes essential to the realization of
legislative ends.
b. The impact of publicity
A modicum of additional analysis is required. Each year,
U.S. courts hand down a staggering volume of opinions which
arouse little public interest. While obscure tax and bankruptcy
decisions may activate the salivary glands of the occasional
attorney or legal academic, such adjudications are likely to
elicit from the average citizen nothing more enthusiastic than a
prolonged yawn. In fact, these cases more often than not pass
by the layman entirely unnoticed. However, the situation be-
comes quite different when matters of public health reach the
courts. People are understandably fascinated by the judicial
resolution of issues which could potentially effect their person-
al, physical well-being at some point in the future. Ever per-
ceptive, the mainstream media inevitably caters to these inter-
ests. For example, many widely circulated newspapers ran
stories about both the federal district and circuit court disposi-
tions of the Stamps and King cases, each detailing the sad
plight of the plaintiffs who had been denied the opportunity to
seek compensation for their injuries."4° These articles general-
140. See Lee Berton & Edward Felsenthal, FDA Approval Shields Firms in Injury Suits,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1993, at BI (reporting that the King court had ruled that FDA approval of
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ly conveyed the important message that certain medical devices
approved by the FDA can give rise to injuries which patients
"can't do anything about" 41 in terms of legal recourse.
Consequently, the considerable publicity surrounding cases
like Stamps and King, publicity which laments the loss of civil
remedies for plaintiffs in the Class III medical device context,
necessarily must lead the average citizen to become more wary
of new, FDA-approved devices. 42 Indeed, Collagen Corpora-
tion has recently recognized that negative media reports such
as those discussed above have led to a decline in consumer
receptivity to their products. 43 However, one can convinc-
ingly argue that the revenue losses experienced by Collagen
should be at least partially attributed to that aspect of media
coverage which portrays the company's devices as unsafe, as
opposed to information regarding the lack of judicial recourse
associated with the products. Concededly, it is probably impos-
sible to determine with any degree of certainty the magnitude
medical devices bars state law damage claims); Briefly: Health, L.A. TamS, Jan. 8, 1992, at D2
(reporting that the U.S. district court disposition of the Stamps case held that the plaintiff's
"claims regarding the company's allegedly defective manufacturing, labeling and warning were
pre-empted by Medical Device Amendments to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act"); Alan
Derringer, Collagen Conflict: Lawsuits Prompt New Look At Cosmetic Injections, CI. TRiB.,
Nov. 8, 1992, at Womanews 12 ('In the past year, federal judges in two instances ruled that
patients had no right to sue because the injections had been approved by the FDA"); Judy Fore-
man, Collagen Case Called Ill Omen for Consumers: Judge: FDA Approval Precludes Liability
Suit, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 17, 1992, at 61 ("Several lawyers who specialize in product liability
law said the rulings threaten not just the rights of patients who have been given collagen
injections, but also those of anyone claiming injury from a Class IH medical device, the desig-
nation for the potentially most dangerous medical devices"); Judy Foreman, Rulings May
Jeopardize the Right of Patients to Sue Manufacturers, SEATrLE TIMES, Mar. 20, 1992, at Al
("The judges ruled that because FDA approval means, in theory, that if an approved product is
manufactured, packaged and labeled in accordance with strict guidelines, then suits against the
manufacturers are 'pre-empted,' in that federal regulations take precedence in state and federal
courts"); Judge Dismisses Suit that Claimed Collagen Cause of Disease, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct.
26, 1991, at A38, Feb. 23, 1993, at A18 (correction) (discussing the pre-emption of state products
liability suits against Collagen Corporation); Ruling Shields Medical-Device Manufacturers: FDA
Approval of Some Products Bars Liability Lawsuits, Court Says, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEws, Jan.
22,1993, at lG ("In the [King] decision, the 1st U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Boston ruled that
federal regulatory approval of some medical devices largely shields the products' makers from
lawsuits seeking damages for injuries to users").
141. Foreman, supra note 140, at 61.
142. See Allinger, supra note 14, at 6 ('The average consumer, aware that manufacturers are
now insulated from liability, will be less willing to try new medical products").
143. Annual Report to Shareholders, Collagen Corporation, Sept. 27, 1993, at 20 ('The
Company believes the lack of growth in demand in North America in fiscal 1993 was primarily
due to the lingering effects of the recession and adverse publicity, which resulted from continuing
negative reports from the media concerning cosmetic procedures").
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of the respective roles played by each of these factors in de-
pressing sales of Zyderm and Zyplast. Nevertheless, it logically
follows that horror stories regarding the unavailability of prod-
ucts liability remedies attendant to newly approved Class III
medical devices conceivably could create an adverse effect
upon consumer willingness to subject themselves to innovative
treatments.' 4 This state of affairs might prove desirable with
respect to products of questionable validity such as Zyderm
and Zyplast, but what of other genuinely worthy devices? What
rational individual would not hesitate in acquiescing to a physi-
cian-recommended treatment with any new, FDA-sanctioned
medical device after reading about the legal "dead end" con-
fronted by others similarly situated? 45
To illustrate, imagine for a moment a hypothetical, new,
PMA-approved Class III medical device claimed to be useful
in alleviating a particular ailment. Further suppose that the
manufacturers of this device have provided the FDA with
complete and accurate information regarding testing and safety
data.'" Now, stretch the imagination to its limits and enter-
tain the ludicrous proposition that the FDA has diligently and
impartially reviewed the potential efficacy of the product
through the PMA process.147 Finally, assume the investigation
ultimately yields legitimate FDA approval; all available signs
indicate that the new device will work an astounding benefit to
society. Shortly thereafter, Patient X is diagnosed as having
fallen victim to the particular illness for which our device is
helpful. Patient X's physician informs him that the FDA has
just approved a brand new medical device which holds great
promise for his full recovery. However, Patient X has recently
read an article which related the woeful sagas of Jennifer
Stamps and Jane King, two fellow patients who had been in-
jured by FDA-sanctioned medical devices, but were neverthe-
less denied the opportunity to sue for damages." As a result,
Patient X opts for the other alternative suggested by his physi-
144. See supra note 140.
145. Id.
146. But see supra notes 110-14, 124 and accompanying text.
147. But see supra notes 100-06, 124 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 140.
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cian: treatment with a relatively outdated device which, al-
though boasting an impressive and well-established safety
record, is generally agreed to be substantially and empirically
less effective than the new device.
Let us change the scenario slightly. Assume that the ficti-
tious device discussed above is swiftly marketed after rigorous
FDA scrutiny and, after one year, a considerable number of
patients derive substantial benefit from its use. However, one
individual, Patient Y, immediately sustains serious injuries
from use of the device. The cause of the harmful effects are
largely unknown, but a preliminary study indicates that the
number of patients who could be expected to experience simi-
lar difficulties is relatively small. Patient Y brings a products
liability suit against the manufacturer of the device in state
court. The case is eventually dismissed by a federal appellate
court which holds that section 360k of the MDA 49 pre-empts
the action. A number of prominent newspapers report the de-
tails of Patient Y's misfortune. Several months later, Patient Z
is identified as a candidate for treatment with the new device.
Patient Z is told by his physician of the product's remarkable
success story, but is warned about the sketchy medical details
surrounding the Patient Y mishap. However, Patient Z is more
worried about the legal details. He has already read articles
concerning the insurmountable medical bills Patient Y faced
after a federal court denied him the chance to sue for damages.
Thus, Patient Z becomes daunted by his uncertainty and refuses
to be treated with the new device.
The first example attempts to demonstrate the possibility
that widely publicized tales of pre-emption related to any sin-
gle device, whether truly unsafe or not, could lead to a "chill-
ing effect" on patient eagerness to try other new and objec-
tively beneficial Class III medical devices. Perhaps more im-
portantly, the second example endeavors to illustrate that the
mere existence of injuries caused by a device does not conclu-
sively establish defective design, negligent failure to warn, or
any other charge of manufacturer wrongdoing."' In short, a
149. See supra text accompanying note 34.
150. Professor Madden has thus expressed the point
[Un a products liability action it is not enough to show only that an injury was caused
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device which causes physical harm in a few isolated instances
may nevertheless still pass muster under the standards of rea-
sonableness erected by state products liability law, and work an
overall benefit to society. Admittedly, a few well-documented
accounts of anomalous injuries alone could have an adverse
effect on patient perceptions of a device which is, on balance,
otherwise largely beneficial. Notwithstanding, as the second
hypothetical suggests,' consumer incentive to forego useful
new technologies intensifies when consumers learn that not
only are injuries possible, but also that they will be denied the
chance to prove manufacturer error if harm does occur. In this
regard, it is important to recognize that a patient's decision
regarding whether to submit to treatment with any newly ap-
proved Class III medical device usually will be, at its base, the
product of an informal weighing of benefits and burdens.'
Therefore, even if conversations with physicians indicate that
the ratio of total users of a given Class HI device to injured
users is relatively minute,'53 the informed patient also will
consider the reality that legal redress will not be an option
should he or she eventually prove to be among the unfortunate
minority. Physicians, presumably better-versed than the average
by a product. Plaintiff is required to prove that the injury was caused by a defect in the
product, and this is true whether the plaintiff proceeds on a theory of negligence,
warranty, or strict tort liability. In misrepresentations, liability may be imposed for
harm caused by a nondefective product, but in a products liability action, it is the de-
fectiveness of the product that gives rise to liability. Thus knives may cut, steam may
bum, automobiles may crash, and injury may result without liability on the part of the
manufacturer or seller, if such injury was not caused by a defect in the product.
M. STUART MADDEN, PRODUCTS LIABmLTY § 1.1 (2d Ed. 1988). Even strict liability generally
may not be imposed on a seller unless a given product has been sold "in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the consumer ... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
(1965). The Official Comments accompanying § 402A state that the burden of proof that "the
product was in a defective condition at the time that it left the hands of the particular seller is upon
the injured plaintiff; and unless evidence can be produced which will support the conclusion that
it was then defective, the burden is not sustained." Id. at cmt. g. Moreover, "[t]he article sold must
be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer
who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics." Id. at cmt. i.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 148-50.
152. See infra note 178.
153. Note that, since the current PMA system features incentives for device manufacturers to
withhold important product safety information from the FDA, see supra text accompanying notes
107-14, 124, physician attempts adequately to inform patients of the relative risks and benefits of
a given treatment, see infra note 178, may be frustrated. See infra text accompanying notes 174-
93.
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citizen in recent legal and medical developments in their field,
also may be reluctant to recommend the use of new Class HI
medical devices after learning of the current judicial trend
toward pre-emption of state products liability claims. 54 As
suggested previously, such calculations often may tend to tip
the mental balance of both patients and care-givers away from
the use of truly salutary devices."5
Furthermore, recall that our hypotheticals presuppose a
responsible pattern of FDA regulatory oversight.'56 As we
have seen, however, the reality of the situation is quite to the
contrary. If the PMA process continues to be characterized by
the blatant disregard for patient safety exhibited in recent
years,"57 we can only expect that sub-standard quality controls
will cause damaging stories of medical device-related injuries,
along with coincident tales of judicial pre-emption,'58 to
mount. As a result, the level of popular reticence toward new
devices steadily will rise; introduction to the market of truly
safe, new medical devices will become increasingly rare, and
any hope for the public to embrace these exemplary products
may be eliminated by frequent reports of pre-empted lawsuits
and uncompensated injuries.'
Conversely, the availability of state products liability rem-
edies may in many cases reassure patients and their physicians
that, in the event of injury, the individual at least will be af-
forded an attempt to prove that the device at issue is unreason-
ably unsafe. Secure in the knowledge that the potential for
pecuniary recompense is not absolutely foreclosed, the analyti-
154. Such hesitancy on the part of physicians might be magnified when health care
professionals realize that pre-empted suits against device manufacturers generally leave the
aggrieved individual with one possible outlet for recovery: a medical malpractice claim. Cf Slater
v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1330, 1334 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that pre-emption "does
not affect cases charging negligence [by the physician or] failure to obtain the patient's informed
consent to the procedure"); Corrigan v. Davne, 853 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (although
plaintiff was injured by a medical device subject to the MDA, that statute does not pre-empt
common law claims alleging malpractice, failure to obtain informed consent, civil conspiracy, or
failure to properly diagnose and treat).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 145-50.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 145-47.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 100-24.
158. See supra note 140.
159. Indeed, even a partial list of recent MDA pre-emption decisions is quite lengthy. See
supra note 80.
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cal scales shift, and patients may be more willing to accept a
degree of risk attendant to treatment. In this way, medical
device consumers might eventually come to realize fully the
benefits of new Class III medical devices in a manner consis-
tent with the intent of the 94th Congress.1" Therefore, given
the potential impact of the pu1qlicity surrounding cases like
Stamps and King, the loss of state products liability remedies
for injured Class III device consumers must be viewed as in-
consistent with the attainment of the legislatively announced
"immediate access" objective.
B. Assessing the Damage and Restoring the Balance
Before we proceed with our analysis, let us engage in a
brief recapitulation in an attempt to gain a more meaningful
focus on the development and current state of the MDA. If we
believe the recent avalanche of federal case law, Congress
expressly intended that section 360k of the legislation pre-empt
state products liability laws in order to encourage the rapid
development and marketing of new Class III medical devic-
es.161 On paper, the goal of protecting public health was to be
simultaneously achieved through the exhaustive statutory provi-
sions which together comprised the PMA process. 62 Howev-
er, Congress did not fail to prioritize between these two poten-
tially conflicting legislative objectives; the pursuit of consumer
safety was avowedly the more critical purpose to be served by
the MDA.163 Alas, as we have seen, the delicate balance of
the theoretical model envisioned by Congress has subsequently
encountered two unforeseen, but unsettling obstacles in prac-
tice. Indeed, the drafters of the MDA certainly did not antici-
160. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
161. See supra note 80.
162. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F. 2d 1130, 1138 (1st Cir.) ("Concededly, the
[legislative history of the] . . . Medical Device Amendments of 1976, shows the principal
emphasis to be on the protection of the individual user"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 84 (1993);
Desmarais v. Dow Coming Corp., 712 F.Supp. 13, 16 (D.Conn. 1989) ("Mhe sole purpose of the
[MDA] is to protect and preserve public health"); MDA Legislative History, supra note 82, at
1071 ("Medical device legislation is intended to assure that medical devices ... meet the
requirements of safety and effectiveness before they are put in wide-spread use throughout the
United States") (emphasis added).
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pate the flagrant incidents of industry misdealing and FDA
complaisance which have recently served to undermine the
ability of the PMA system to safeguard the health of new Class
Il medical device consumers. Concurrent with these develop-
ments, moreover, the lower federal courts have steadfastly af-
firmed the existence of pre-emption as a legislative means to
work aggressively towards the subservient "immediate access"
objective. To make matters worse, the continued vitality of the
pre-emption approach in the PMA context has threatened to
operate as a drag upon valuable manufacturer safety incentives.
The ultimate result is a regulatory program which is clearly
positioned, albeit unintentionally, to favor the attainment of a
secondary legislative goal ("immediate consumer access")
almost to the exclusion of a primary Congressional end (patient
safety).' 6
The sections which follow seek to illustrate specifically
how the incentives created by the present, malfunctioning
MDA system" might translate into the premature marketing
of new Class I1 medical devices under circumstances which
unduly jeopardize the various health and safety interests of
patients in a variety of contexts. In this regard, the gravity of a
given patient's affliction will be weighed against the risk inher-
ent in the potential outcome. Our discussion will conclude that
it is necessary, through the abolition of state products liability
law pre-emption under the MDA, to sacrifice a degree of "im-
mediate access" in order to augment the legislation's current
capacity to ensure public health. Only by affording due defer-
ence to the well-documented ability of tort actions to encour-
age product safety and deter deceptive manufacturer conduct
can the proper prioritization of MDA legislative objectives be
restored."
164. The insight of one commentator affords a telling analogy, highly germane to our
analysis. Addressing the pre-emption issue in the context of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1994), Professor Atwell notes: "A... criticism of the
courts that pre-empt is that they treat the goals of protecting the economy and informing the
public of health hazards as equal goals. If they examined the... legislative history... these
courts would learn that... [p]rotecting the economy is clearly secondary to that of protecting
public health .... Atwell, supra note 47, at 207.
165. See supra notes 88-124 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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1. Cosmetic Devices
First, a patient's interest, to say nothing of the national
interest, in the swift marketing of new Class In medical devic-
es decidedly diminishes in the context of purely cosmetic treat-
ments. As the Stamps and King cases so cogently illustrate,
many consumers have experienced significant problems with
medical devices approved in some form by the FDA which are
generally useful only in the cure of dermatological or aesthetic
problems.167 These devices include Retin A, silicone, and col-
lagen.1" Although various skin conditions certainly can be
classified as an annoyance, one can probably safely wager that
Jennifer Stamps and Jane King would readily exchange their
current autoimmune difficulties for the wrinkles which led to
their initial treatment with Collagen Corporation's products. 9
If the loss of state tort law and its attendant safety incentives is
the price consumers must pay for mere access to a dangerous
and uncertain chance at a clear complexion, that price is sim-
ply too onerous to bear.
Surely an individual's interest in physical well-being
should not yield any appreciable ground to potentially counter-
manding interests involving wrinkle-free skin or more attractive
breasts. As the Honorable Donald M. Payne so succinctly
stated the point, "[w]hen a patient buys a product or treatment
that is supposed to make them look better, they should not be
risking permanent disfigurement or potentially fatal illness-
es."'70 Thus, to the extent that the applicability of state prod-
ucts liability law would encourage safe products and interfere
with the ability of Class I]l medical device manufacturers to
develop and market their cosmetic wares swiftly in cooperation
with an overly accommodating FDA," these minor inconve-
niences should be tolerated, given the dismal alternative.
167. See generally OPERATIONS REPORT, supra note 92.
168. Id. at 3-9.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 38-79.
170. OPERATIONS REPORT, supra note 92, at 41 (additional views of Hon. Donald M.
Payne).
171. See supra notes 100-06, 124 and accompanying text.
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2. Non-Cosmetic Devices
This is not to suggest, however, that the aim of immediate
access to newly developed Class HII medical devices should su-
persede the goal of public health where these devices are
claimed to be helpful in treating highly debilitating diseases.
Again, it is absolutely critical to remember that Class III medi-
cal devices are subject to the most extensive federal regulation,
at least in theory, because they are considered to be of such a
nature that any lesser degree of scrutiny unnecessarily could
jeopardize the health or life of a patient." Therefore, while it
would be unreasonable for citizens to expect that every new,
FDA-approved device without exception will eliminate, or even
improve the serious illness for which it has been employed,
consumers should at least be entitled to presume that such
devices have not been marketed with undue haste and without
regard to product safety in the name of instant consumer acces-
sibility. In light of recent developments,173 pre-emption af-
fords no such guarantee.
Nevertheless, in some cases patients are confronted with
terminal illnesses for which no reasonably effective treatments
exist. Faced with this scenario, one might argue that the goal
of rapid consumer access to new Class III medical devices out-
weighs the public interest in health and welfare. After all,
physicians can be told of known product risks and side-effects
following the PMA process and then may pass this information
along to patients, thus allowing informed consent. 74 Since
the patient's prognosis is so dim, the argument goes, is not any
new treatment not preferable to none at all? Not necessarily.
The most significant risk in this area is that industry misdeal-
ing coupled with apathetic FDA regulation will lead to the
instant marketing of new Class 1II medical devices which de-
ceptively offer a promise for beneficial results substantially
greater than that which would have been suggested by a more
deliberate evaluation. 75 In addition, concealed safety data and
inadequate testing might fail to apprise physicians of product
172. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C) (1994).
173. See supra notes 99-124 and accompanying text.
174. See infra note 178.
175. See supra notes 99-124 and accompanying text.
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defects which could render the patient's last days fewer and
more painful than would have been the case had the patient
simply chosen to live out the rest of his or her life in relative
comfort and serenity with the aid of traditional palliative drugs
and analgesics.'76 In this regard, the final weeks of a dying
individual's life are obviously a time of great stress for both
patient and family. This brief period may provide the opportu-
nity for cathartic good-byes, shape memories of the deceased,
and create lasting impressions regarding the peacefulness and
dignity with which death occurred.1" Every minute may be
precious. Thus, the terminal patient has a strong interest in be-
ing able to weigh reliable medical information concerning the
chance for prolonged life or recovery afforded by a new medi-
cal device against the personal need to orchestrate the end of
his or her life.' By removing manufacturer incentives to en-
176. At least one physician has explained the intricate nature of patient decision making
when confronted with terminal or often terminal illnesses:
[The patient] remained very clear about her wish not to undergo chemotherapy and to
live whatever time she had left outside the hospital .... [S]he was convinced she
would die during the period of treatment and would suffer unspeakably in the process
(from hospitalization, from lack of control over her body, from the side effects of
chemotherapy, and from pain and anguish) .... IThere was no way I could say any of
this would not occur .... I know how to use pain medicines to keep patients
comfortable and lessen suffering. I explained the philosophy of comfort care, which I
strongly believe in.
Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision Making, 324 NEW ENG.
J. Mmn. 691, 692-93 (1991). Although cancer is not a disease for which no possible treatment is
available (as evidenced by the existence of chemotherapy), the analogy rings true in the present
discussion if we liken chemotherapy to the type of new, risky Class III medical device which
might become available for an illness which had no cure prior to its introduction.
177. The experiences of Dr. Quill also lend support to this assertion:
[I] ... felt strongly that I was setting her free to get the most out of the time she had
left, and to maintain dignity and control on her own terms until her death .... Her son
stayed home from college, and they were able to be with one another and say much
that had not been said earlier. Her husband did his work at home .... She spent time
with her closest friends .... [S]he illustrated in a most profound and personal way the
importance of informed decision making, the right to refuse treatment, and the
extraordinarily personal effects of illness and interaction with the medical system.
Id. at 693.
178. Ultimately, the choice of whether to accept treatment with a given Class In medical
device rests with the individual patient. The doctrine of informed consent imposes a legal duty on
physicians to provide patients with a "reasonable disclosure of the choices with respect to
proposed therapy and the dangers inherently and potentially involved." Canterbury v. Spence, 464
F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 560 (1972). The scope of this disclosure
generally must include "the inherent and potential hazards of the proposed treatment, the
alternatives to that treatment, if any, and the results likely if the patient remains untreated. The
factors contributing significance to the dangerousness of a medical technique are, of course, the
incidence of injury and the degree of harm threatened." Id. at 787-88.
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gage in rigorous and candid product evaluation, pre-emption
effectively reduces patient decision making in this context to
the level of dangerous guesswork. Sadly, the FDA has proved
unwilling to intervene on the public's behalf.'79
In other cases, the patient's status will be so grave that
any available treatment will present the risk of accelerated
illness or death.' Because the patient will probably die ab-
sent any treatment, he or she in essence risks the loss of a few
extra months of life in exchange for a slight chance at tempo-
rary improvement or recovery. Here again, however, the poten-
tial use of a new, allegedly more effective Class Id medical
device should not elevate the pursuit of rapid consumer access
above the goal of public health. As long as pre-emption per-
sists and the FDA can be viewed as remiss in the exercise of
its regulatory authority,18' and hence to have abdicated its
statutory role as public protector, dishonest industry practices
will continue unhindered and physicians will not be able to
provide patients with an accurate indication of the likely risks
and side-effects associated with a nascent device. 2 Similarly,
doctors will be ineffective in determining the overall merits of
an instrument in relation to existing modes of treatment."3
Thus, suppose that Patient A is diagnosed with an illness
generally considered to be terminal. The best existing measures
applicable to this particular ailment reliably offer a five percent
chance of full recovery, a five percent chance of two additional
years of life, and a ninety percent chance of severe side-effects
resulting in a death more rapid than that which would be ex-
pected if all curative attempts were refused. Before Patient A
makes his decision, industry-censored figures serve as the basis
179. See supra notes 99-124 and accompanying text.
180. For example, patients who have developed acute myelomonocytic leukemia currently
may choose to undergo induction chemotherapy. This procedure involves three weeks of
hospitalization, prolonged neutropenia, probable complications involving infection, and likely
hair loss. Quill, supra note 176, at 692. Twenty-five percent will die. Id. The survivors must
endure consolidation chemotherapy, which entails similar side effects. Id. Another 25% likely will
die at this stage. Id. The remaining 50% of the original group must then submit to bone marrow
transplantation, which promises two months of hospitalization, whole-body irradiation, and
potential infectious complications and graft-versus-host disease. Id. Fifty percent of the patients
will die at this stage. Id.
181. See supra notes 100-06, 124 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 173-79 and accompanying text; supra note 178.
183. See supra note 178.
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for a "rubber stamp" FDA approval of a new, Class III medical
device claimed to be useful for A's disease. These sugar-coated
numbers boast a ten percent chance of full recovery, a ten
percent chance of two additional years of life, and an eighty
percent chance of premature death. Patient A unwittingly
chooses the new device, although an honest and accurate re-
view would have revealed an actual success rate for the new
device slightly lower than that of the older treatment. Patient A
dies having lost the benefit of a few percentage points which
could have meant the difference between life and death. A
great deal of time, money, and familial anguish is on the line
when a patient decides to risk his or her mortality on the glim-
mer of hope provided by an unpredictable, last-ditch effort at
preserving life.'84 The law has an obligation to ensure that
these assets are not squandered on an illusory prospect engen-
dered solely by the siren song of "immediate access" and pro-
mulgated without consideration of public safety. However, the
denial of products liability remedies to Class III device con-
sumers reduces the probability that patients and physicians will
receive credible information regarding new products.
In still other instances, the patient's condition is highly
debilitating, but not life-threatening. Here the consumer may be
faced with a choice between older, somewhat imperfect treat-
ments and a newer medical device which promises a chance at
a more complete return to health. Such cases can be likened to
the factual situation apparent in a 1992 federal appellate deci-
sion, Slater v. Optical Radiation Corporation.8 ' In Slater, the
plaintiff sought eye treatment following cataract surgery.'
Since this operation destroys the natural lens, normal vision
must be restored with special glasses or contact lenses.'87
However, in 1984, Mr. Slater's physician presented him with a
third option, an intraocular lens.'88 This device is installed
directly into the eye in the space between the cornea and the
iris."' Slater elected to receive treatment with the intraocular
184. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
185. 961 F.2d 1330 (7th Cir. 1992).
186. Id. at 1332.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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lens. Shortly thereafter, he experienced pain, infection, and the
deterioration of vision in his left eye."9 Ultimately, Mr.
Slater sustained permanent injury to the eye above and beyond
the damage done by the cataract. 9
The Slater case provides an example of the type of prob-
lems which can occur when new medical devices are uncere-
moniously introduced to the public. Although corrective glasses
or contact lenses would have been inconvenient and perhaps
less effective than the intraocular lens had the device per-
formed as expected, these marginal benefits surely were not
worth the risk of permanent near-blindness. Our now-familiar
mantra still applies: evidence of poor product performance can
be lost in a PMA system capable only of assuring instant prod-
uct marketing, and the use of a new Class II device may pres-
ent an unreasonable health risk where patients suffer from
serious, but non-fatal conditions and where reasonable, more
established alternative treatments are available.
The arguments advanced above become all the more con-
vincing when we note that the Medical Device Amendments
already provide a regulatory "shortcut" through which new
medical devices can be made available immediately to patients
facing serious, fatal, or unique diseases. These "fast tracks" to
marketing are entitled the Investigational Device Exemption
(IDE)'" and the Humanitarian Device Exemption (HDE).193
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g) (1994). The IDE statutory provisions declare that "It is the purpose
of this subsection to encourage, to the extent consistent with the protection of the public health
and safety and with ethical standards, the discovery and development of useful devices intended
for human use and ... freedom for scientific investigators in their pursuit of that purpose." Id.
§ 360j(g)(1). Thus, an approved IDE application "permits a device that otherwise would be
required to comply with a performance standard or to have premarket approval to be shipped
lawfully for the purpose of conducting investigations of that device" 21 C.F.R. § 812.1(a) (1992).
FDA approval of an IDE application exempts the device at issue from regular MDA requirements
with respect to misbranding, registration, listing, premarket notification, banned devices,
recording and reporting, restricted devices, good manufacturing practices, and color additives. 21
U.S.C. § 360j(g)(2)(A) (1994); 21 C.F.R. §812.1(a) (1992). Certain "grandfathered"
investigations and investigations involving devices other than "significant risk devices" are
considered to have approved IDE applications, subject to various "abbreviated requirements." Id
§ 812.2(b). In addition, devices requiring IDE approval can be made available fairly rapidly given
that "[ain application ... for an exemption for a device ... shall be deemed approved on the
thirtieth day after the submission of the application [unless disapproved] . 21 U.S.C.
§ 360j(g)(4)(A).
However, the IDE process is by no means wholly unregulated. The Federal Regulations
1996]
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The relevant provisions quite correctly recognize that in some
cases, the primary goal of public health must temporarily yield
to rapid public access, and hence exempt "promising experi-
mental devices from the usual requirement of establishing the
safety and efficacy of a medical device before it can be
sold." '194 Through its neglect, however, the FDA has essen-
tially evaluated all new Class Ill medical devices, even devices
requiring full PMA scrutiny, under the less stringent standards
intended only for the IDE and HDE programs. 95 The distinc-
tion is important because the MDA demands that manufactur-
ers assure the FDA that all patients treated with devices mar-
keted under schemes like the IDE receive full informed con-
sent. " In this way, patients know treatment risks ahead of
time, or are at least well-aware that the device to be employed
has been subjected to relatively little formal testing. Armed
with this information, a patient cannot later be heard to com-
plain if the "experiment" goes awry. Indeed, the plaintiff in the
Slater case, discussed above, was rightly denied the opportuni-
ty to sue for his injuries precisely because he had expressly
agreed to participate in an intraocular lens clinical investigation
under IDE auspices."9 In contrast, when pre-emption encour-
accompanying § 360j(g) establish special requirements for IDE devices and their clinical usage
pertaining to labeling, 21 C.F.R. § 812.5, application procedures (if required), id. § 812.20,
investigational plans, id. § 812.25, reporting of prior investigations, id. § 812.27, FDA approval,
id. § 812.30, supplemental applications, id. § 812.35, monitoring, id. § 812.46, significant risk
device determinations, id. § 812.66, recording, id. § 812.140, inspections, id. § 812.145, and
reporting, id. § 812.150.
193. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(m) (1994). The HDE provisions have the stated purpose of encour-
aging "the discovery and use of devices intended to benefit patients in the treatment and diagnosis
of diseases or conditions that affect fewer than 4000 individuals in the United States." Id.
§ 360j(m)(1). HDEs may not be granted unless the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) determines that "the device will not expose patients to an unreasonable or
significant risk of illness or injury and the probable benefit to health.., outweighs the risk of
injury or illness from its use, taking into account the probable risks and benefits of currently
available devices or alternative forms of treatment." Id. § 360j(m)(2)(C). As of March, 1994, the
Secretary of HHS had not yet issued the federal regulations to guide the HDE process.
194. Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1330, 1331-32 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 321 (1992).
195. See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g)(3)(D) (1994) ("[A person applying for an IDE shall]
assure that informed consent will be obtained from each human subject (or his representative) of
proposed clinical testing involving such device..
197. Judge Richard Posner explained:
The consent form that Mr. Slater signed informed him that he had a choice of treat-
ments, one of which was experimental; he chose the experimental [treatment]. The
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ages industry deception and a concomitant FDA ambiva-
lence,"'8 thus creating a covert, de facto reduced regulatory
standard, physicians are not prepared to warn patients that
"anything can happen." In these circumstances, the treating
physician is able to warn the patient of only those product risks
which the manufacturer and the FDA have seen fit to disclose
and evaluate.' 9 Any extraneous drawbacks which arise after
treatment will be wholly unexpected by the doctor, and will
have been completely unconsidered by the patient during his
delicate and critical decision making calculus."
IV. CONCLUSION: A PROPOSED SOLUTION
It should be clear that while Congress unambiguously
intended that the MDA serve the end of public health first and
foremost,"' device manufacturer misdealing,2' undeterred
by complaisant FDA practices, 3 has left the PMA process
largely incapable of achieving this objective. Little remains of
the statutory scheme save an incentive doggedly to pursue the
very real, but unquestionably subordinate "immediate access"
goal. As a result, we have recognized the catastrophic uncer-
tainty for both patients and physicians which this misguided
experimental procedure was riskier because, by definition, there was limited
experience with it. Provided that the risks, including any loss of state tort remedies,
were adequately explained to Slater, he cannot complain that the risks materialized.
Slater, 961 F.2d, at 1333-34. For other cases pre-empting state tort claims brought against
manufacturers by patients injured due to IDE medical devices, see Gile v. Optical Radiation
Corp., 22 F.3d 540 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 513 U.S. 965 (1994); Duncan v. Iolab Corp., 12 F.3d
194 (11 th Cir. 1994); Covey v. Surgidev Corp., 815 F.Supp. 1089 (N.D. Ohio 1993); Hunsaker v.
Surgidev Corp., 818 F. Supp. 744 (M.D. Pa. 1992). However, in five consolidated cases, a federal
district court recently held that claims alleging failure to obtain informed consent with respect to
IDE devices were not pre-empted under the MDA. See Angelle v. Intermedics Intraocular, Inc.,
No. 93-0403, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17805 (E.D. La. Dec. 9, 1993); Bordenave v. Intermedics
Intraocular, Inc., No. 93-0407, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17807 (E.D. La. Dec. 9, 1993); Caronia v.
Intermedics Intraocular, Inc., No. 93-0405, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17809 (E.D. La. Dec. 9, 1993);
Ferrara v. Intermedics Intraocular, Inc., No. 93-0404, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17811 (E.D. La.
Dec. 9, 1993); Lewis v. Intermedics Intraocular, Inc., No. 93-0007, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17808
(E.D. La. Dec. 9, 1993).
198. See supra notes 96-124.
199. See supra notes 107-17, 124 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 178.
201. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 107-14, 124 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 99-106, 124 and accompanying text.
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approach could create. Although one might simplistically assert
that the solution is merely to insist that the FDA "clean up its
act," preservation of state products liability actions for injured
Class III medical device consumers stands as the only pragmat-
ic means to enhance product safety incentives,' 4 and hence
implement some semblance of the proper balance between the
two laudable legislative objectives. 5 The threat of lower
profit margins, not governmental agencies, is the way to ensure
quality. Therefore, Congress should amend the MDA to pro-
vide explicitly for the preservation of state products liability
remedies for injured consumers of Class II medical devices.
If this sound advice is heeded, new Class III devices will
tend to be marketed only so expeditiously as the public's le-
gitimate interest in health and welfare will allow. Device pro-
ducers who opt negligently to breeze past the "paper tiger" of
the FDA may at last slam into the brick wall of products liabil-
ity. Industry officials may come to realize that comprehensive
testing and disclosure during the PMA process is infinitely
more cost-effective than being forced to clean up the mess af-
terwards. Truly exigent circumstances will continue to be ad-
dressed, without fear of liability,' through IDE and HDE
procedures.' Manufacturers who continue to ignore statutory
204. See supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
205. Many commentators have suggested additional, more generic justifications for the
continued availability of state products liability remedies. See, e.g., GuDo CALABRESi, THE COST
OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYsIs 68-129 (1970) (explaining that products lia-
bility laws encourage allocative efficiency and ensure that the market price of a product reflects its
true costs); James A. Henderson, Coping With the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69 CAL.
L. REV. 919, 931-39 (1981) (asserting that strict liability potentially satisfies goals related to
fairness, encouraging investment in product safety, discouraging consumption of hazardous prod-
ucts, reducing transaction costs, and promoting loss spreading); David G. Owen, The Moral
Foundations of Products Liability Law: Toward First Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 427,
506 (1993) (arguing that products liability laws should serve and be guided by moral values such
as "freedom, including truth and equality, and community, including community and sharing");
Robert A. Prentice & Mark E. Roszkowski, "Tort Reform" and the Liability "Revolution":
Defending Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products, 27 GoNZ. L. REv. 251 (1991-92) (noting
that products liability laws tend to spread risk and cure disparities between consumers and
manufacturers in terms of bargaining power, knowledge, risk appreciation, and transaction costs);
Kathryn D. Sowle, Toward A Synthesis of Product Liability Principles: Schwartz's Model and the
Cost-Minimization Alternative, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 88 (1991) (recognizing that
compensation, risk spreading, manufacturer's probable negligence, and minimization of accident
costs are all at least partial justifications for the imposition of products liability).
206. See supra note 197.
207. See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
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priorities will finally find themselves taken to task for their
willful disregard, caught in the "safety net" long provided by
state tort theories.2
208. There are, of course, competing arguments available to those who would continue the
current trend toward pre-emption under the MDA. For example, one might suggest that the MDA
should be permitted to afford a uniform scheme of federal regulation in the medical device arena.
However, several courts have rejected this notion. See, e.g., Desmarais v. Dow Coming Corp.,
712 F. Supp. 13, 16 (D.Conn. 1989) C"Mhe [MDA] is not concerned with promoting uniform
national standards (other than minimum standards); the sole purpose of the Act is to protect and
preserve public health"); Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1493 (D. Kan. 1987)
("Uniformity is a goal to be achieved in the interest of more fully protecting citizens from unsafe
products - it is not to be achieved by sacrificing public health").
Another potential argument would insist that product manufacturers should be able to rely
on compliance with federal standards as fulfilling their legal responsibilities to the consumer. Cf.
Landen, supra note 96, at 115 ("[W]here the federal government has already addressed the issue
of appropriate drug labelling and design, individual states should not be permitted to formulate
their own requirements"). Nevertheless, the amendment process would function to serve advance
notice to manufacturers that mere adherence to FDA regulations does not end their legal duties.
Moreover, it is far from clear that most medical device manufacturers have actually "earned"
immunity from liability through strict fidelity to MDA testing and reporting requirements. See
supra notes 107-14, 124 and accompanying text.
Although the pre-emption debate continues to rage in the courts and law journals,
sparking intricate arguments regarding federalism concerns and technical explications regarding
whether state products liability law actually constitutes a "requirement" under 21 U.S.C. § 360k,
the power to change the law ultimately lies with Congress. If courts like Stamps and King have
misread Congressional intent as expressed in § 360k with respect to the pre-emption issue, our
analysis should demonstrate the need for remedial legislative action. If, however, the modem
judicial trend has properly interpreted § 360k as the vehicle through which Congress intended to
achieve the important ends of the MDA, our purpose has been to re-assess the wisdom of that
decision in light of public policy and pragmatic experience. The ultimate question, then, is not
whether there are arguments to be made for and against pre-emption under the MDA. Rather,
Congress must decide which position best serves, on balance, the legislative goals established for
the MDA. Based on our analysis, the answer should be clear.

